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I. INTRODUCTION 
 Immigration and citizenship are both fraught areas of policy. The 
federal government has long exercised broad authority over 
immigration and the status of aliens; that authority is often tested by 
states.1 And immigration and citizenship both raise difficult trade-offs. 
Americans live in a country dedicated to the proposition that “all men 
are created equal” and entitled to “unalienable” rights.2 That 
proposition seems to favor relatively welcoming immigration policies 
and relatively easy paths to state and national citizenship. But our 
founding documents also take for granted that we constitute “one 
people,”3 and on that basis general commitments to human equality 
and freedom may need to be reconciled with considerations that limit 
access to the United States and United States citizenship. 
 In his recent book Local Citizenship in a Global Age,4 Kenneth 
Stahl studies a slice of immigration and citizenship policy. The book 
focuses on the efforts of a few cities in the United States to chart their 
own courses on topics associated with immigration and citizenship. 




†Professor, Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason University. 
 1. See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012). 
 2. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).  
 3. Id. 
 4. KENNETH A. STAHL, LOCAL CITIZENSHIP IN A GLOBAL AGE (forthcoming). 
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‘citizenship federalism’”; “citizenship” gets “distributed at multiple 
scales” of government “simultaneously, and often on divergent 
grounds.”5 Second, today, when governments disagree with each other 
about immigration and citizenship policy, the disputants are usually 
local governments on one hand and the federal government on the 
other.6 Today, “states play[] a passive role” in debates over 
immigration and citizenship policy, while “local and federal 
governments tend to distribute citizenship in ways that are . . . in direct 
contradiction.”7  
 To describe the different views that lead governments to disagree 
about immigration and citizenship, Local Citizenship in a Global Age 
introduces many different models of citizenship. It argues that three 
models have dominated to this point. One is a “republican” model, 
which expects citizens to “exercise [their] judgment to the best interest 
of the [community] without regard to [their] own personal financial or 
familial interest.”8 In the “liberal” model, citizenship is not so much 
“a set of civic responsibilities” as a status; it entails “the right of an 
individual to own private property and safeguard it.” Since citizenship 
does not entail many responsibilities in the liberal model, that model 
can “be extended far and wide.”9 In contrast with both the republican 
and the liberal models, “the ethno-nationalist [model] considers 
citizenship a device for linking a group of people together under the 
banner of a shared culture or identity.”10 Local Citizenship in a Global 
Age also introduces two models for municipal governments to institute 
going forward—models of postmodern and differentiated citizenship, 
both of which delink citizenship in a municipality from citizenship in 
that municipality’s state and country.11 
 Local Citizenship in a Global Age is an enriching book. It calls 
attention to some important developments in local government, 
citizenship, and immigration policy. It conveys wonderfully how 
messy the law and politics are around immigration and citizenship.  
And the book is imaginative when it makes recommendations about 
immigration and citizenship policy at the municipal level.  
 In this review Essay, I survey the most valuable lessons from 
Local Citizenship in a Global Age. But I have some reservations about 
 
 5. Id. at 4. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. at 21. 
 9. Id. at 24. 
 10. Id. at 26. 
 11. See id. at 191–224. 
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the book, and I want to mark those off as well. The book comes off as 
critical of views that seek to control immigration and to establish 
relatively demanding criteria for noncitizens to become citizens. In my 
view, two factors contribute to this impression, and the book would 
have been more satisfying if both had been addressed.  
 First, Local Citizenship in a Global Age does not account for a 
phenomenon I call here “cosmopolitanism.”12 The book focuses a 
great deal on the possibility that opponents oppose open immigration 
and easy citizenship because they are too attached to race or 
nationality—hence the ethno-nationalist model of citizenship.13 But 
people can also be detached from their own communities, and 
particularly from the habits and values that help constitute community 
life and make it satisfying. Sometimes that detachment is appropriate, 
sometimes it is not, and in either case the tendency needs to be studied. 
That tendency is called “cosmopolitan” in this Essay. I suspect that 
cosmopolitanism plays a role in the events and policies studied in 
Local Citizenship in a Global Age. I also suspect that cosmopolitanism 
shapes policy conflicts as much as Stahl’s “liberal,” “republican,” and 
“ethno-nationalist” models. 
 Second, Local Citizenship in a Global Age does not portray in 
their most favorable light the concerns that lead some citizens to 
oppose high-volume immigration and easy paths to citizenship. The 
book suggests that policies that oppose open immigration and easy 
citizenship cannot be grounded in liberal views.14 Again, the book 
assumes there are three main models of citizenship—liberal, 
republican, and ethno-nationalist.15 It seems easy to justify policies 
that oppose open immigration and easy citizenship on grounds that 
seem (to lay people) communitarian or (in Stahl’s presentation) 
republican. It also seems easy to associate those policies with ethno-
nationalist desires, though those associations come nowhere close to a 
defense. But those policies seem impossible to square with liberal 
tenets about government, freedom, and justice. Yet many political and 
thought leaders have assumed that a program for government can at 
once be liberal and patriotic—supportive of country, one’s people, and 
 
 12. Martha C. Nussbaum, Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism, BOS. REV. (Oct. 1, 
1994), http://bostonreview.net/martha-nussbaum-patriotism-and-cosmopolitanism 
[https://perma.cc/4V6H-TYQF]. Nussbaum made this contrast popular, and I follow 
her usage here. Nussbaum later expanded her thoughts on both in MARTHA C. 
NUSSBAUM, THE COSMOPOLITAN TRADITION: A NOBLE BUT FLAWED IDEAL (2019).  
 13. See STAHL, supra note 4, at 102. 
 14. Id. at 59–60. 
 15. Id. at 21. 
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one’s way of life. I want to sketch an account of patriotic liberal 
theories and explain the implications for the argument in Local 
Citizenship in a Global Age. 
 This Essay’s argument proceeds as follows. Part II restates the 
argument of Local Citizenship in a Global Age. Part III surveys the 
book’s strengths and highlights my main concerns. Part III identifies 
the void in the book that cosmopolitanism would fill, and Part IV 
discusses the psychological tendencies that contribute to the 
cosmopolitan mindset. Part V explains why liberal theories of 
government can incorporate patriotic elements, and Part VI outlines 
the main concerns that animate patriotic liberal theories. Part VII 
explains the implications that Parts III through VI have for Local 
Citizenship in a Global Age. 
II. THE ARGUMENT OF LOCAL CITIZENSHIP IN A GLOBAL AGE 
 Local Citizenship in a Global Age proceeds in three parts. Part I 
supplies the background readers will need to follow the rest of the 
book’s argument. Chapter 1 introduces the three models of 
citizenship—liberal, republican, and ethno-nationalist. Chapter 2 
shows how citizenship is regulated by different levels of government 
in the American federal system. Many assume that central 
governments reserve plenary authority to grant or withhold 
citizenship. Nevertheless, in practice, the federal government 
“determine[s] who qualifies as a citizen based on characteristics such 
as identity or demonstrated loyalty,” while local governments make 
de facto determinations who count as citizens by deciding whom to 
give advantages like public benefits, public services, and protection 
from land-use regulations.16 Chapter 3 supplies a quick overview of 
local citizenship in the ancient world . . . and the transition in the 
Western world from small city-states with republican citizens to 
extended nation-states with less demanding expectations of 
citizenship.17  
 Part II presents three case studies of local citizenship in action. 
Chapter 4 studies how United States municipalities and (later) states 
enfranchised women before the Nineteenth Amendment.18 A few 
American municipalities have extended perquisites of citizenship to 
noncitizen residents, and Chapter 5 studies these extensions—to the 
 
 16. Id. at 40; see id. at 41. 
 17. See id. at 69–81. 
 18. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX; see id. at 85–95. 
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franchise, to access to health care and local banking institutions, or to 
equal access to benefits of state citizenship like public education, 
tuition discounts, and state-supported health care.19 Some 
municipalities extend perquisites of citizenship to nonresident 
landowners, and Chapter 6 studies those extensions.20 When Stahl 
interprets all of these developments, he relies on the three models of 
citizenship introduced in Chapter 1. When federal authorities made 
and administered national citizenship policies, they focused on 
concerns that loom large in republican or ethno-nationalist models. 
Because local citizenship is so far removed from national citizenship, 
Stahl argues, they could focus on the concerns that justify the liberal 
model.21 But politics have gotten more complicated in the last 50 years 
because of globalization. Because “globalization is destabilizing” 
existing political orders and distinctions, “the distinction between 
local and federal citizenship is breaking down.”22 “[T]he liberal 
conception of citizenship that prevails at the local level has bled into 
the federal level,” and that bleeding has “unsettl[ed] the ethno-
nationalist and republican conceptions thought to be safely enshrined 
there.”23 Chapter 7 demonstrates that claim. 
 Part III considers three alternative models of citizenship. Chapter 
8 explains why it is necessary to consider alternatives: If the models 
studied in Part II are unraveling, then theorists and policymakers need 
new models to replace the unraveling ones. Chapter 9 studies one 
possible source for such a model: neo-republican theories of 
citizenship. But Stahl finds neo-republicanism wanting; he argues that 
municipalities are expanding their franchises and offering public 
benefits to a wide range of noncitizens in “direct response to the 
failures of nation-state citizenship.”24 Chapter 10 considers 
postmodern citizenship, in which “citizenship consists largely of 
accommodating oneself to the wide diversity and difference of urban 
life.”25 But Chapter 10 also offers a sober warning about postmodern 
citizenship. Because this conception “refus[es] to draw any boundaries 
 
 19. See STAHL, supra note 4, at 97. 
 20. See id. at 124–40. 
 21. See id. at 92–93, 103, 127. 
 22. Id. at 142. 
 23. Id.  
 24. Id. at 175 (citing and criticizing MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE, 
38–39 (1983)). 
 25. Id. at 192 (citing GERALD FRUG, CITY MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNITIES 
WITHOUT BUILDING WALLS (1999); Gerald E. Frug, City Services, 73 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 23 (1998)). 
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around places at all” in public life, it may—however unintentionally—
encourage residents to “flee to neighboring suburban communities 
where they can exercise more control over their environments.”26 
Chapter 11 offers what Stahl portrays as a compromise between neo-
republican and postmodern models—“differentiated citizenship.”27 
Differentiated citizenship encourages people to develop political 
relationships not directly between themselves and the state but instead 
through the media of “cultural group[s]”—“different national, ethnic, 
or religious groups to which they belong”—“intermediate between the 
individual and the state.”28 
III. ASSESSING LOCAL CITIZENSHIP IN A GLOBAL AGE 
 Local Citizenship in a Global Age is an enriching book. It tackles 
several of the most pressing topics in politics today. As Stahl observes, 
Donald Trump became President of the United States in large part 
because he voiced concerns about American foreign and citizenship 
policy that few conventional politicians had been willing to raise.29 
The same questions have roiled politics in Europe; they contributed to 
the five years of turmoil that the United Kingdom went through before 
it withdrew from the European Union.30 
  Stahl offers many fine insights on these topics. Chapters 5 and 6 
in particular contribute significantly to legal and political science 
scholarship on citizenship policy. Chapter 5 provides an invaluable 
report on the efforts of states and municipalities in the United States 
to extend to people who are not U.S. citizens voting rights and benefits 
that often run with citizenship. Chapter 6 fills an important gap when 
it recounts changes by municipal governments to extend the franchise 
to nonresident landowners. 
 Local Citizenship in a Global Age also provides a helpful primer 
about municipal and state citizenship policy in a global age. As I 
explain below, Stahl and I probably disagree whether the trends he 
describes in his book can or should be reversed. But if one grants that 
globalization is hard to reverse, Chapters 9, 10, and 11 help mark off 
 
 26. Id. at 208, 204. 
 27. Id. at 208 (crediting WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP 
(1995); IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE (1990)). 
 28. Id. at 208–09. 
 29. See id. at 1–5. 
 30. See, e.g., James McBride, What Brexit Means, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL.: 
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the choices that policy makers must make. Republican citizenship, 
postmodern citizenship, and differentiated citizenship present 
different models of citizenship, and those models should help readers 
appreciate what local citizenship might entail in an age in which 
globalization seems to be weakening people’s attachments to their 
political communities.   
 Which takes me to the last enriching feature of Local Citizenship 
in a Global Age: The book makes readers think hard about citizenship 
and political allegiance. Someone who lives in Takoma Park is at once 
a resident of a municipality, a state (Maryland), a nation-state (the 
United States), and in some sense the world. The first three 
jurisdictions have some claims on that person’s allegiance, and maybe 
the world does now, too. Does every one of those jurisdictions need to 
march in lockstep with the others when it sets policy about 
citizenship? Clearly not, and Local Citizenship in a Global Age 
convinces me as much. How should citizenship be structured? At its 
core, citizenship consists of a status and the right to vote in a 
jurisdiction’s elections. Does it also entail rights of access to public 
assistance services? Rights of access to education? Rights to be free 
from investigation and possible deportation by other sovereigns? How 
do we classify people to whom a municipality extends some of these 
advantages but not all? I had not considered issues like these before 
reading Local Citizenship in a Global Age, and I am grateful to Stahl 
for forcing me to think them through. 
 Even so, I am not persuaded by the main argument in Local 
Citizenship in a Global Age. I favor immigration and citizenship 
policies that combine what Stahl calls liberal and republican 
elements—a mix that I call “natural rights republicanism.”31 In my 
opinion, a just political community should be at once (in Stahl’s 
formulation) liberal and republican. Such a community should be 
liberal in “its dedication to equality and natural rights,” but it should 
be republican in maintaining “public morals . . . inculcat[ing] respect 
for equality and natural rights.”32 Probably because I find natural 
 
 31. Eric R. Claeys, Review of Thomas G. West, The Political Theory of the 
American Founding: Natural Rights, Public Policy, and the Moral Conditions of 
Freedom, 44 INTERPRETATION 319, 319 (2018). 
 32. Id. at 321–22; see also Eric R. Claeys, The Private Society and the Liberal 
Public Good in John Locke’s Thought, 25 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 201 (2008) 
(interpreting JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION (Rob Hay ed., 
McMaster University Archive of the History of Economic Thought 2004) and JOHN 
LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 
1988) (1690)). 
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rights republicanism satisfying, I am more interested in studying 
citizenship at the state and national levels (pace Stahl) and less so in 
studying it at the municipal and global levels. In my opinion, the 
weakening of state and national citizenship could have been arrested 
more than is assumed in Part II of Local Citizenship in a Global Age.  
 It should come as no surprise, then, that I have two broad concerns 
about Local Citizenship in a Global Age. I worry that the book does 
not account adequately for some of the forces that have destabilized 
state and national citizenship. I also worry that the book does not 
portray charitably enough views that might justify policies limiting 
immigration and setting demanding criteria for citizenship. The first 
concern is taken up in the next two Parts of this Essay, and the second 
concern is discussed in Parts V and VI. 
IV. IMMIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP, AND COSMOPOLITANISM 
 Let me start with my concern about the forces that question the 
primacy that state and national governments have traditionally 
exercised over immigration and citizenship policy. Stahl’s three-part 
taxonomy seems to be missing a possibility. Again, Local Citizenship 
in a Global Age introduces three models of citizenship—liberal, 
republican, and ethno-nationalist.33 The liberal and republican models 
are obviously normative models. As Stahl portrays them, “liberal” 
arguments always militate in favor of strong individual rights, and 
they deny communities authority to withhold laws protecting those 
rights.34 “Republican” arguments always militate in favor of strong 
communities—a strong sense of “public”—and relatively closed 
communities at that.35 The ethno-nationalist model, by contrast, is not 
normative. The traits that move people to be loyal to race or country 
are facts about human nature; they describe psychological forces that 
structure human sociability.36 These forces can be coopted toward 
goals both good and bad but are themselves morally neutral.  
 In short, Local Citizenship in a Global Age introduces both 
normative and psychological models, and those models cut in different 
directions in citizenship and immigration policy. To appreciate how 
the models relate to each other and to relevant theory, we can arrange 
them in a table:  
 
 33. See STAHL, supra note 4, at 21. 
 34. Id. at 32. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 26. 
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Table 1. Models of citizenship37 




immigration (and, for 
making citizenship 
difficult to earn) 
For opening 
immigration (and, for 
making citizenship easy 
to earn) 
Normative Republican Liberal 
Psychological Ethno-nationalist ? 
  
 As Table 1 helps show, something seems missing. Ethno-
nationalism covers the psychological forces that might lead people to 
favor keeping their political communities relatively closed, restricting 
immigration, and restricting access to citizenship only to people who 
resemble existing citizens relatively closely.38 As Local Citizenship in 
a Global Age suggests, however, for a couple of generations, these 
forces have been losing ground.39 So it seems reasonable to ask 
whether the passions that lead people to embrace ethno-nationalist 
views are getting confronted and even overridden by other opposing 
passions.  
 I can think of such a cluster of passions. The passions in this 
cluster have been described in a few different ways. The most 
sympathetic descriptive term is “cosmopolitan.” Cosmopolitans find 
connections that people have besides their national identities more 
ennobling than connections tied to those identities.40 As Martha 
Nussbaum portrays things, politics can be based on three different 
elements: “ethnic and racial and religious difference,” “shared 
national identity,” and “[w]hat we share as rational and mutually 
dependent human beings.”41 Cosmopolitans believe that the third 
element takes priority over the first two: People are not “above all 
citizens of the United States” or any other country but instead “above 
all citizens of a world of human beings.”42 The best-known 
unsympathetic descriptor is “oikophobic.” “Oikophobia” is a 
neologism developed by Roger Scruton. It plays on another 
neologism, the word “xenophobia,” which conjoins the Greek words 
 
 37. Id. at 38–39. 
 38. Id. at 27–28. 
 39. Id. at 21. 
 40. Martha C. Nussbaum, Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism, BOS. REV. (Oct. 1, 
1994), http://bostonreview.net/martha-nussbaum-patriotism-and-cosmopolitanism 
[https://perma.cc/4V6H-TYQF]. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
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xenos (stranger, or foreigner) and phobia (fear).43 “Oikophobic” 
switches out xenos and inserts instead the Greek word oikos, for 
“home.”44 Scruton argues that oikophobia fairly describes tendencies 
that motivate intellectuals, particularly intellectuals in a society with a 
mass culture.45 Intellectuals tend to find more in common with 
intellectuals from other cultures than they find with non-intellectuals 
from their own cultures. In addition, because intellectuals like to 
manipulate ideas, they dislike being tied to existing ways of doing 
things and existing orders.46 Many intellectuals “see[] that which is 
[their] own, [their] inheritance, as alien,” Scruton argues, and they feel 
“tainted by its claim on [them].”47 In response, intellectuals often 
“portray [their] home as something Other, by means of a stereotype 
that seems to free [them] from all obligation toward it,” and they tend 
to see “other cultures” and people of those cultures “through a 
sentimental haze.”48  
 Scruton describes accurately many of the passions that motivate 
intellectuals. When it comes to choosing terms to describe those 
motivations, however, I will follow Nussbaum and not Scruton. In 
part, I do so for reasons of charity. Like “xenophobic,” “oikophobic” 
does not seem a term appropriate to civil discourse about a fraught 
topic.49 And in part, I do so to make the term I use to describe people 
who mistrust closed communities track its opposite, “ethno-
nationalist.” Like ethno-nationalist political passions, cosmopolitan 
passions can be coopted in good and bad causes. Some people want to 
improve the lots of individual peoples and social groups, and they 
earnestly believe that local practices and lifestyles hold those people 
and groups back. In some contexts, those motivations can make 
people’s lives better. In the wrong contexts, however, those same 
motivations can backfire. Cosmopolitan policies can be well-
intentioned and yet destabilize local social institutions that mutually 
dependent beings need to prosper. The policies that Stahl describes as 
republican can be reinforced, for better or worse, by social passions he 
 
 43. The History of the Word ‘Xenophobia,’ MERRIAM WEBSTER, 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/words-at-play/a-short-history-of-xenophobia 
[https://perma.cc/NW4N-XSAB] (last visited Mar. 22, 2021). 
 44. Roger Scruton, Oikophobia, 175 J. EDUC. 93, 96 (1993). 
 45. Id. at 96. 
 46. See id.  
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 97.  
 49. The term “xenophobic” detracts from the argument when used in Local 
Citizenship in a Global Age. See STAHL, supra note 4, at 17, 176, 191, 207.  
  
2021] LIBERALISM, PATRIOTISM, AND COSMOPOLITANISM IN 11 
 
describes as ethno-nationalist. By the same token, policies he 
describes as liberal can be reinforced, for better or worse, by 
sentiments and social passions that might fairly be called 
cosmopolitan. The argument of Local Citizenship in a Global Age 
seems incomplete without an account of those latter sentiments and 
passions. 
V. NATURAL RIGHTS, COSMOPOLITANISM, AND PATRIOTISM 
 In Part III, I warned that Local Citizenship in a Global Age may 
not portray charitably enough views that might justify restricting 
immigration and setting demanding criteria for noncitizens to become 
citizens. I want to come back to that warning here. To illustrate my 
concern, I will study the ways in which the book uses the term 
“liberal” and the phrase “natural rights.” As used in Local Citizenship 
in a Global Age, these terms always support policies for open political 
communities and easy-to-satisfy citizenship tests. But these terms can 
also be used to support policies that make national and local 
citizenship respectable. In other words, not every political program 
that is liberal and devoted to natural rights is cosmopolitan; some such 
programs justify what might be called “patriotic” commitments. 
 As portrayed in Local Citizenship in a Global Age, “liberalism 
asserts that all human beings have natural rights,” and “liberal 
citizenship should in principle be available to all regardless of 
nationality.”50 Not necessarily. To avoid confusion, I do not mean to 
suggest that Stahl is using “liberal” or “natural rights” in misleading 
or idiosyncratic senses. “Liberal” and “natural rights” can take on 
different meanings in different contexts. On one hand, “liberal” and 
“natural rights” are both theoretical concepts. When theoretical 
concepts are introduced and defended in theoretical discussions, they 
can be justified carefully with qualifications to alleviate any extreme 
tendencies they have. On the other hand, “liberal” and “natural rights” 
can also be applied straightaway to political life. In the rough and 
tumble of political life, they tend to be applied as slogans with few or 
no qualifications. Local Citizenship in a Global Age assumes that 
“liberal” and “natural rights” have the meanings they have in slogan 
portraits and in libertarian political theories. But other political 
theories appeal to natural rights and liberalism at a fundamental level 
 
 50. Id. at 29. Although Stahl speaks specifically of Lockean liberalism, this 
passage explains how he relies on his so-called “liberal” model throughout the rest 
of the book. 
  
12 TEXAS A&M J. PROP. L. [Vol. 8 
 
to justify many practical policies that laypeople would associate with 
love of one’s own country. Again, I have associated such theories with 
“natural rights republicanism.” But one could just as plausibly call 
such theories “patriotic liberal” theories, and that is the phrase I use 
here.  
VI. COOPTING PATRIOTISM FOR LIBERALISM AND NATURAL RIGHTS 
 Patriotic liberal theories should not seem outlandish or far-
fetched. Although the United States Declaration of Independence is 
dedicated (again) to natural rights and equality, it is a declaration for 
“one people” resolved “to dissolve the political bands which have 
connected them with another” and set “to assume [a] separate and 
equal station” as an independent nation.51 Although claims like these 
may sound paradoxical, they rest on reasonable and serious concerns. 
Consider how Nussbaum justifies cosmopolitan political projects: 
Such projects respect peoples’ equal rights to develop their capacities 
as rational, mutually dependent beings.52 But what if it turns out that, 
precisely because people are mutually dependent beings, they need 
their social lives ordered? And what if social order hinges on people’s 
agreeing to norms and goals that are common in their community but 
disputed by many other people? Thomas Jefferson, lead author of the 
Declaration, assumed that people needed to agree on basics of social 
and political life to be free: “It is for the happiness of those united in 
society to harmonize as much as possible in matters which they must 
of necessity transact together.”53  
 When liberal and natural rights theories require patriotic qualities, 
they rely on several reinforcing considerations. Four stand out.54 
 First, when citizens like their country and trust their fellow 
citizens, the affection and trust help secure individual rights. People 
cannot be secure in their natural rights unless fellow citizens respect 
them as bearers of natural rights. In principle, as a matter of pre-
political morality, all people are equally entitled to natural rights. 
Sadly, however, in practice, many people do not recognize or accept 
that claim. In many times and places, people have believed that they 
do not need to follow principles of justice when they transact with 
 
 51. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).  
 52. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 12, at 2. 
 53. THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA, in THE WRITINGS 
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 120 (Albert Ellery Bergh ed., 1907). 
 54. ERIC R. CLAEYS, NATURAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (forthcoming). The 
arguments in this Part are drawn from chapter 2 of the forthcoming book.  
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people they classify as Others—people from another family, tribe, 
ethnicity, religious sect, or political faction.55 After the United States 
deposed Saddam Hussein, violence erupted in Iraq, and much of the 
violence has been motivated by mistrust among Iraqi Sunnis, Shiítes, 
and Kurds.56 In Federalist No. 2, John Jay was optimistic that the 
Constitution of 1787 would not lead the peoples of the several states 
into similar violence. But Jay was confident because he believed that 
state citizens were members of “one united people . . . descended from 
the same ancestors, speaking the same language, professing the same 
religion, attached to the same principles of government, [and] very 
similar in their manners and their customs.”57 Stahl cites this passage 
as an example of the ethno-nationalist model.58 But Jay made these 
observations in an argument that the Constitution of 1787 would 
secure the American people their natural rights more effectively than 
the Articles of Confederation were securing them.59 
 Second, patriotism can make people more secure in natural rights 
associated with personal safety and collective security. Sadly, nations 
and peoples may need to go to war to defend their citizens and 
possessions. Before a nation goes to war, it is reasonable for its people 
to expect all citizens to be loyal enough to the government and its 
projects to contribute to their defense. Stahl justly gives John Locke 
significant credit in ushering in political liberalism.60 Locke assumed 
that all commonwealths could and should “not permit[] any part of 
their Dominions to be dismemb[e]red, nor to be enjoyed by any but 
those of their Community.”61 A community may justly reserve 
property ownership to “those of their community,” Locke insisted, and 
the reasonable explanation is that people whose property is protected 
by a commonwealth have more stake in fighting for it. 
 
 55. Michelle Maiese, Principles of Justice and Fairness, BEYOND 
INTRACTABILITY (July 2003, last updated July 2020), 
https://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/principles_of_justice 
[https://perma.cc/9SQF-3JMT].  
 56. See Prejudice in Iraq: Shiítes, Sunni, and Kurds, ENCYCLOPEDIA.COM, 
https://www.encyclopedia.com/social-sciences/news-wires-white-papers-and-
books/prejudice-iraq-shiites-sunni-and-kurds [https://perma.cc/WME8-7USS] (July 
10, 2021).  
 57. THE FEDERALIST NO. 2, at 6 (John Jay) (George W. Carey & James 
McClellan eds., 2001). 
 58. See STAHL, supra note 4, at 27.  
 59. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 2, supra note 57, at 5.  
 60. See STAHL, supra note 4, at 24. 
 61. LOCKE, supra note 32, at 346. For readers who cannot access the version of 
the Two Treatises cited here, the quote in the text comes from the Second Treatise, 
chapter VIII, section 117.  
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 Third, a liberal community needs to be communitarian in a few 
specific dimensions—most of all, in socializing citizens to have the 
social and political virtues expected in a system of republican 
government. Every political regime needs citizens to have character 
traits that contribute to the regime’s overarching goals. As Michael 
Zuckert explains, even in a regime dedicated to natural rights, the 
government may establish and maintain “‘rights infrastructure’—the 
pattern of social institutions and characterological types that makes 
rights-securing possible.”62 The Virginia Constitution’s Bill of Rights 
supplies a representative list of the character traits needed by a free 
people: “[N]o free government, nor the blessings of liberty, can be 
preserved to any people, but by a firm adherence to justice, 
moderation, temperance, frugality, and virtue.”63  
 Fourth, people may be better able to exercise some of their natural 
rights if they use patriotism criteria to grant applications for 
citizenship. This possibility matters the most in relation to natural 
rights to engage in social activities. People cannot associate with one 
another without common ground rules, and in many cases, they need 
governments to establish those ground rules. But different peoples 
may rely on different ground rules for similar associations, and people 
in one community may reasonably demand that prospective citizens 
understand and respect the ground rules and goals they have set for 
associations in that community. Consider the application of the 
territory of Utah for United States statehood. Polygamy was widely 
practiced and tolerated in the territory of Utah. Congress barred the 
practice and barred Utah from becoming a state until it barred the 
practice.64 Congress prevented Utah and Utahans from associating 
with the citizens of the then-existing States on equal terms. Congress 
was motivated by a range of concerns: Citizens comfortable with 
polygamy would jeopardize poorer men’s rights to marry, women’s 
rights to be treated equally in marriage, children’s rights to be raised 
in stable families, and the rights of all adults except male polygamists 
to associate politically as equals.65 
 
 62. MICHAEL P. ZUCKERT, LAUNCHING LIBERALISM: ON LOCKEAN POLITICAL 
PHILOSOPHY 283 (2002). 
 63. VA. CONST. art. I, § 15. 
 64. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164–66 (1878) (discussing the 
act codified at 12 Stat. 501 (1862)); see also Jessie L. Embry, Polygamy, UTAH HIST. 
ENCYC., https://www.uen.org/utah_history_encyclopedia/p/POLYGAMY.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/QW27-HJCM] (July 10, 2021) (reporting that Utah recently 
enacted a law reducing the penalty for polygamy from a felony to a misdemeanor). 
 65. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 165.  
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 To be sure, if a political community follows a theory like the one 
just sketched, it relies on commitments that could be described as 
republican and nationalist. But those commitments get subordinated. 
They come to be part of the community’s project to the extent that they 
run consistent with and help strengthen its most basic liberal 
commitments.  
 To avoid confusion, when a community strives both to secure 
rights and promote patriotism, the efforts to promote patriotic policies 
do not justify violations of the rights of outsiders. As Thomas West 
explains, natural rights obligate every people “not [to] harm 
foreigners’ lives, liberty, or property. But when [a people] refuse[s] to 
admit foreigners to [its] community, [it] do[es] not treat them unjustly 
or deny them their rights. [It] simply leave[s] them in the same 
condition they were in before.”66 In other words, natural rights set 
baselines. Those baselines mark off standards of conduct that decent 
societies should not violate. Communities may structure their laws, 
policies, and social institutions to secure citizens’ rights far more 
effectively than citizens could enjoy the rights outside those 
communities. But to that extent, communities generate benefits to 
their citizens. Patriotic communities may justly withhold those 
benefits from noncitizens, but they may not justly violate the rights of 
noncitizens. 
VII. RECONSIDERING LOCAL CITIZENSHIP IN A GLOBAL AGE 
 Now, the last Part provided only a highly compressed sketch of 
the reasons why a theory of natural rights and liberalism might expect 
patriotism of its citizens, and why it might institute requirements for 
citizenship that evaluate applicants for citizenship by how patriotic 
they promise to be. But the sketch should make clear that patriotic 
liberal views are not crazy. Since they are not crazy, they have 
important ramifications for the argument in Local Citizenship in a 
Global Age. I want to close by considering that book’s argument in 
light of the last Part’s observations about patriotic liberal views—and 
also in light of Part IV’s observations about the effects of 
cosmopolitan passions in politics. Again, as Part II explained, Local 
Citizenship in a Global Age makes it seem inevitable that globalization 
would overwhelm the control that state and national governments have 
 
 66. THOMAS G. WEST, VINDICATING THE FOUNDERS: RACE, SEX, CLASS, AND 
JUSTICE IN THE ORIGINS OF AMERICA 158 (1997). 
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exercised over immigration. Part IV and the last Part make that trend 
seem less inevitable. 
 Three implications go to the descriptive claims of Local 
Citizenship in a Global Age. First, assume that some citizens oppose 
open immigration and easy paths to citizenship. What motivates such 
citizens—liberal views, republican views, or ethno-nationalist views? 
The book strongly suggests that such citizens are in the grip of ethno-
nationalist views. At the outset, the book assumes: “Among the 
Americans who elected Donald Trump President, there is a seething 
anxiety over the perception that the meaning of citizenship is being 
diluted.”67 In the book’s three-model framework, only ethno-
nationalists can be the kinds of people in the grip of “seething 
anxiety.”68 But there is a possibility not considered: Maybe those 
citizens are liberals who think that republicanism, patriotism, and 
familiarity with important cultural traits all reinforce liberalism.  
 Now consider the citizens and political leaders who stand in 
opposition to the citizens who seem as seething and anxious. In Local 
Citizenship in a Global Age’s three-part framework, the only factor 
that can explain why such citizens and leaders might support 
extending citizenship, the franchise, and public benefits is a 
commitment to liberalism. To be sure, many people do sincerely 
believe that people who are not United States citizens should be 
entitled to citizenship, the right to vote, and the benefits that states and 
the federal government extend to citizenship if they want to move 
here. Since the book suggests that citizens and leaders who oppose 
easy paths to citizenship are motivated primarily by ethno-nationalist 
views, by logic and fairness it really should have considered whether 
citizens and leaders who support broad access to citizenship are 
motivated primarily by cosmopolitan sentiments.  
 One last descriptive question. When municipalities make policies 
about citizenship, how influential are, on one hand, (what Stahl calls) 
republican and ethno-nationalist or (what I prefer to call) patriotic 
liberal views, and, on the other hand, liberal or cosmopolitan views? 
Local Citizenship in a Global Age reports that there is a “trajectory” 
and “pattern” in favor of expanding the franchise and its perquisites to 
 
 67. STAHL, supra note 4, at 3. 
 68. See id. at 7 (describing Trump voters as “hav[ing] turned a resentful eye 
toward cities”); id. at 8 (“backward-looking, place-bound, and racialized conception 
of citizenship”); id. at 17 (“quasi-nationalist xenophobia, in which outsiders are 
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noncitizens.69 Is the trend that pronounced? In the book’s report, the 
franchise has been extended by the state of New York (in school board 
elections, until elected school boards were abolished), the city of 
Detroit, and ten Maryland municipalities; municipalities in Maryland, 
Vermont, and Massachusetts have at least debated extending the 
franchise.70 In my view, those extensions are not widespread enough 
to say that there is a clear and unshakeable consensus for expanding 
the franchise. I interpret the same facts as follows: Some 
municipalities support federal immigration policies, many more say 
little about those policies (probably because they think they have little 
to add), and a small number of municipalities go in a different 
direction—in states that tend to be progressive in national politics and 
cosmopolitan in their outlooks.  
 The concerns I am expressing here have normative implications 
as well. Again, one of the two main lessons of Local Citizenship in a 
Global Age is that local governments can and sometimes should set 
citizenship policies different from the ones set by state or federal 
governments.71 Part III studies three different conceptions of 
citizenship that municipalities might try to promote—if globalization 
creates new challenges that the state and national governments are 
incompetent to address, and if the liberal conception seems too “thin 
[a] gruel” for municipalities to promote.72 In Parts IV and VI, though, 
I identified two considerations that militate in favor of limiting 
municipal policy-making on citizenship. As Part VI explained, 
citizens in any community have strong interests in being assured that 
fellow citizens are loyal to their common political project and well-
socialized enough to respect important institutions like marriage, 
contract, and political processes. In a federal system, central 
governments are better positioned than municipal governments are to 
factor in the effects of policies on common culture; in the United 
States, that difference favors limiting municipal control over 
immigration policy and keeping such control in the hands of the states 
or the federal government.73 
 Separately, Local Citizenship in a Global Age suggests that state 
and federal policies often rely too much on the ethno-nationalist 
model, and it also suggests that municipal governments can counteract 
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 70. See id. at 2–3 n.6. 
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these tendencies.74 Fair enough. Since every government can make 
mistakes, however, a full account of citizenship federalism needs to 
anticipate that municipal governments might make mistakes when 
they institute policies affecting citizenship. As Part IV showed, people 
can get caught up not only in desires to be surrounded only by people 
of similar races or nationalities but also in cosmopolitan desires to 
downplay traits and habits that distinguish particular peoples. That 
possibility needs to be considered in a full account of citizenship 
federalism, and it is not in Local Citizenship in a Global Age.  
 Finally, the concerns that motivate opponents of broad citizenship 
and easy immigration seem more serious than they seem in Local 
Citizenship in a Global Age. Opponents may not necessarily be 
motivated by desires to exclude people of different races or 
nationalities. Instead, opponents may believe sincerely that a free 
people cannot govern itself unless its members have the traits that Part 
VI associated with patriotism. Concerns like those would justify 
citizenship policies that require proof that new citizens understand 
important aspects of American government and social life. They also 
justify withholding from people who are not citizens public benefits—
access to property, public education, and public health care—intended 
primarily for fellow citizens. Now, these concerns might be 
overwrought, or such concerns might not justify the citizenship and 
welfare policies now in effect in federal or state law. But the concerns 
are serious and durable. Because Local Citizenship in a Global Age 




 74. See, e.g., id. at 83. 
